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ABSTRACT 
 
An insider threat refers to the threat arising from an individual inside an organization that maliciously 
leverages his or her system privileges, and closeness and proximity in a computerized environment to 
compromise valuable information and inflict harm. This scenario is an example of system violation that 
decreases the degree of system trustworthiness. Most cases of system trustworthiness use a peer judgment 
formulation, which may involve bias sentiments towards document sensitivity values. Moreover, audit trails 
of risky document navigation paths are important as an alarm to indicate any violation. Therefore, this study 
presents a combination of the trust criteria and document sensitivity level of an insider to obtain a risk 
value, which will be used to predict the occurrence of an insider threat. This study begins by investigating 
the prominent attributes of insiders with a focus on their degree of experience and skill in line with system 
trust. Subsequently, these prominent attributes are used to construct an insider Trust Profile Matrix (TPM). 
From the TPM, the trust value is calculated and combined with the sensitivity value of each document to 
produce a Risk Matrix (RM). As a result, (i) risk value and (ii) prediction rate and risky path are then 
calculated and analyzed using an Insider Threat Prediction Framework as an alarm for violation occurrence. 
Keywords: Insider Threat, Insider Threat Prediction, Sensitivity Level, Trust Value, Risk Value 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The security information is playing a crucial 
function in protecting confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the data information system [1]. 
Nowadays, it is pointed where every organization 
attempt encounters serious information and network 
security threat that may cause to lose, changing and 
misuse of the data by internal or external users. 
Commonly, insider threat is categorized as a major 
contributor to increased risk and systems damage. 
The present of threats to the system became a huge 
problem in order to maintain the security 
management in the system. 
The insider attack formed the biggest threat on 
database, system and network due to an authorized 
user had the bad behavior or revenge on someone. 
There are many possible issues of occurrence the 
increasing the system risk such as human 
behavioral factors. The availability of 
heterogeneous factors of insider threats in system 
application making it progressively ambiguity to 
identify which factors are contributed to be a 
significant attribute of attacking the system. As 
stated by Neuman [2] insider threat attributes are 
particularly relevant to potential insider misuse the 
system. Among the highlighted attributes in this 
study include insider knowledge, trust, privileges 
and risk assessment. According to Moyano et al. [3] 
indicated that a successful predicting threat depends 
on both technical and behavioral solutions of system 
user. Thus, an appropriate and constructive behavior 
by a system's users can enhance the effectiveness of 
information security while inappropriate and 
destructive behaviors can substantially inhibit its 
effectiveness [4]. 
Some of the insider threat prediction framework 
does not emphasize some important attributes that 
are able to predict the threat may attack the 
document. According to research by Yaseen and 
Panda [5], they extended the previous framework to 
investigate the problem of insider threats in 
relational database systems. A Constraint and 
Dependency Graph (CDG), and the Dependency 
Matrix were developed to represent dependencies 
and constraints of each table and introduce the Threat 
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Prediction Graph (TPG) to predict and prevent an 
insider threat of each table. Their framework also 
did not implement experiments to establish the 
effectiveness of the models until they are extended 
their predicting framework to insider threat 
mitigation [6] using the same technique and 
enhance on evaluation phase to test the 
effectiveness of the framework. However, the 
percentage of the prevented threat ranges from 8 to 
30 % depending on the number of transactions and 
the percentage of write operations in transactions. 
This shows that, the prevention range is still low.  
A sensitivity of data item or document access is 
the document which insider may be interested in 
changing, due to the importance and secrecy of the 
information that it represents [5]. Besides that, 
releasing information about sensitive data carries 
serious risks to privacy. Therefore, priority of each 
sensitive document should be given to provide the 
highest levels to different insider who accesses the 
document. Frequently, an expert has a priority to 
assign the sensitivity level. However, judgment 
from an expert many unknown variables. According 
to Moyano et al.  [3] and peer's judgment processes 
are crucial in the identification of insider 
vulnerabilities. In addition, due to bias of a peer 
assessment, judgment from the experts only is not 
sufficient. Meanwhile an expert is prone to a 
confirmation bias. There also no judgments are 
made as to the accuracy the expert opinion in 
predicting a threat. Therefore, this study has 
motivated to improve the insider threat prediction 
framework by combining the insider trust profile 
matrix with the sensitivity value of each document 
in order to produce the risk matrix.  
The details of this paper are explained more 
details regarding the relate works, case study used, 
proposed framework and the result respectively in 
section 2, 3 and 4. 
 
2. RELATED WORKS 
Insider threat prediction refers to the effort to 
detect the existing threats that were exposed by a 
legitimate user in a systems development. The 
process of prediction insider attack in the 
information system can create a mechanism to 
mitigate and prevent the threat that contributes by 
the insider. According to the previous researches, 
most of the researcher have overcame a few issues 
regarding the threat, especially prediction of insider 
threats in the relational database. 
Prediction insider threats are regularly presented 
by the researcher using the own techniques such as 
Kandias et al. [7] proposed algorithm to predict 
dangerous users. A formal methodology was 
implemented by Sengupta et al. [8], while 
Magklaras and Furnell [9] proposed end user 
sophistication model. Yaseen and Panda [5] also 
proposed insider threat prediction model. 
Althebyan and Panda [10] has suggested a 
knowledge-base model in order to predict insider 
threat. The researchers had developed a Knowledge 
Graphs that able to track knowledge of each insider 
accumulates thus able help in predict the malicious 
act that insider going to implement.  Once the 
knowledge of insider has gained, then clustering 
document based on insider request to access 
document is initiated. Then, insider threat 
prediction algorithm insider threat prediction 
algorithm is implemented in which in this proses, 
involved risk value and attack probability 
calculation.  
Althebyan and Panda [10] and Paci et al. [11] as 
well has brought up insider trust factors in their 
prediction framework. However, the framework did 
not briefly discuss the detail elements of insider 
trust attribute. Besides that, weighted calculations 
of sensitive documents is solely dependent on 
expert judgment that could lead bias.  
 
3. THE CASE STUDY 
E-Plantation System (ePS) has been used as a 
case study.  ePS is a web-based, integrated 
information system that is centralized and 
geographically-distributed that allows users 
remotely access operation sites using the virtual 
private network (VPN). ePS is organized under 
three different levels of operation which are 
headquarters (HQ), region and branch. In this paper, 
only payroll module is used as a focus for this 
study. Under payroll module there are 7 sub 
modules/documents which are Set Earning (PY1), 
Set Deduction (PY2), Set Productivity- Harvester 
(PY3), Set Productivity- Tapper (PY4), Payroll 
Sheet- Salary (PY5), Payroll Sheet- Cash 
Denomination (PY6) and Payroll Checking (PY7). 
Those documents can be accessed by multiple 
insiders which are the developer, system 
administrator, system support, and end user. Table 1 
shows an insider access matrix, in which insider can 
access the following system function such as create 
(C), update (U), read (R), view (V) and process (P). 
Insider access matrix is the important element in 
order to assign the sensitivity value of each 
document. 
Figure 1 shows a structure of payroll document 
that motivated by [10] who are presented the system 
access path using graph based representation. The 
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tree representation is able to demonstrate the 
authorized traversal path for different insider roles. 
Furthermore, it is extended to action including 
create, update, read, view and process that can be 
performed by each insider. Thereby, tree is easy to 
quantify the sensitivity value of each document and 
its action that has been accessed by an insider. 
Payroll structure consists of 4 layers where layer 
number 1 represented the insider developer, system 
support, system administrator or end user. Layer 2 
refers main module of the system, while layer 3 is a 
list document of a selected module. Layer 4 refers 
to the function of each document module. 
 
4. ENHANCEMENT ON RISK VALUE 
QUANTIFICATION 
Insider threat prediction framework has been 
presented as shown in Figure 2 in order to predict 
the violation occurrence performed by system 
insider based on their risky score when navigating 
documents. However, this paper had made 
improvement on insider risk profile matrix as per 
illustrated on Figure 3, this procedure consist of 
four main processes which focuses on combining 
trust component and document sensitivity in order 
to predict the insider violation occurrence. This 
framework embodies Trust Profile Matrix (TPM) 
that specifically designs to characterize the 
knowledge of system insider which is self-feeding 
information. TPM is attributed to skill and 
experience degree of system insider. 
On the other hand, Fung et al. [12] has claimed 
that trust is an important criterion to predict the 
system violation occurrence and they formulated 
trust based on peer judgment. However, trust is 
subjective and peer judgment may bias due to 
human emotions and error prone. Conversely, our 
framework presents that trust value can be 
formulated based on the degree of skill and 
experience of system insider. The details of 
processes are described in the following section. 
 
Table 1: Function and Action of Payroll Module 
Function User Role Create (C) 
Update 
(U) 
Read 
(R) 
View 
(V) 
Process 
(P) 
Set Earning (PY1) 
Developer √ √ √ √ x 
System Administrator x x x √ x 
System Support √ √ √ √ x 
End User √ √ √ √ x 
Set Deduction 
(PY2) 
Developer √ √ √ √ x 
System Administrator x x x √ x 
System Support √ √ √ √ x 
End User √ √ √ √ x 
Set Productivity- 
Harvester (PY3) 
Developer √ √ √ √ x 
System Administrator x x x √ x 
System Support √ √ √ √ x 
End User √ √ √ √ x 
Set Productivity- 
Tapper (PY4) 
Developer √ √ √ √ x 
System Administrator x x x √ x 
System Support √ √ √ √ x 
End User √ √ √ √ x 
Payroll Sheet- 
Salary (PY5) 
Developer x x x x √ 
System Administrator x x x x √ 
System Support x x x x √ 
End User x x x x x 
Denomination 
(PY6) 
Developer √ √ √ √ x 
System Administrator √ √ √ √ x 
System Support √ √ √ √ x 
End User √ √ √ √ x 
Payroll Checking 
(PY7) 
Developer x x x √ x 
System Administrator x x x √ x 
System Support x x x √ x 
End User x x x x x 
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Figure 1: Structure of Payroll Document 
 
 Figure 2: A Framework of Insider Threat Prediction 
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Figure 3:  Procedures to Quantify Risk Value 
 
4.1 Identify Insider Trust Threat Profile 
 
Table 2 summarizes the trust characteristics that 
emphasize two attributes which are experience and 
skill. The insider with high or low skill and 
experience could tend to some issues including; i) 
system handling; ii) bugs/errors; iii) security policy; 
iv) fine tuning server and network; and v) computer 
usage. For insider respondent, they have to answer 
several questions in order to generate insider threat 
profile. As per illustrated in Figure 4 is a sample of 
questionnaire that later on, the result of the 
questionnaire will be used to get the value of 
experience and skill of an insider as based on 
scoring as shown in Table 3 and 4 respectively. 
Answers from the questionnaire are converted into 
experience and skill scoring, in which these value 
will be used to get the trust value. An answers are 
based on roles and the component. Table 5 shows 
an example of experience and skill rating for one of 
an insider role, S1. 
 
 
Table 2: Description of Trust Characteristics 
Component Skill Description Experience Description 
Computer usage 
Insider that has high skill on computer 
usage are positively associated to low 
expose in data leakage. 
Insider that has a good experience on 
computer usage are positively associated to 
low expose in data leakage. 
System handling 
Insider with low skill in handling the 
system are positively associated to low 
expose in data leakage. 
Insider with poor experience in handling 
system are positively associated to low 
expose in data leakage. 
Solving bugs 
Insider with high skill in solving error or 
bug are positively associated to low expose 
in data leakage. 
Insider with poor experience in solving 
error or bug are positively associated to low 
expose in data leakage. 
Security policy 
Insider with low skill on security policy are 
positively associated to low expose in data 
leakage. 
Insider with good experience on security 
policy are positively associated to low 
expose in data leakage. 
Server and 
network fine tune 
Insider with low skill on fine tuning server 
and network are positively associated to 
low expose in data leakage. 
Insider with good experience on fine tune 
server and network are positively 
associated to low expose in data leakage. 
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Figure 4: Sample of Questionnaire 
 
Table 3: Scalar for Experience Scoring Value 
ID Questionnaire rating Experience rating 
1 Strongly Disagree Very Poor 
2 Disagree Poor 
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree Neutral 
4 Agree Good 
5 Strongly Agree Very Good 
 
Table 4: Scalar for Skill Scoring Value 
ID Questionnaire rating Skill rating 
1 Strongly Disagree Very Low 
2 Disagree Low 
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree Medium 
4 Agree High 
5 Strongly Agree Very High 
 
Table 5: Example of Experience and Skill Scalar 
Roles Component ID Questionnaire Skill Rating ID Questionnaire  Experience Rating 
S1 
Computer usage 5 Very High 5 Very Good 
System handling 5 Very High 5 Very Good 
Solving an error/bugs 5 Very High 5 Very Good 
Security policy  4 High 5 Very Good 
Fine tuning server and network 5 Very High 5 Very Good 
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4.2 Calculate Trust Value 
 
On the other hand, Paci et al. [11] have 
claimed that trust is an important criterion to 
predict the system violation occurrence and they 
formulated trust based on peer judgment. However, 
trust is subjective and peer judgment may bias due 
to human emotions and error prone. Conversely, 
this study presents that trust value can be 
formulated based on the degree of skill and 
experience of system insider.  Thus, Trust Profile 
Matrix (TPM) that specifically designs to 
characterize the knowledge of system insider which 
is self-feeding information. TPM is attributed to 
skill and experience degree of system insider.  
Table 6 represents Trust Profile Matrix in 
Scoring Value that are used to calculate the trust 
value. Table 7 illustrate the example of 
predetermined trust value based on component and 
roles of the system user using the TPM provided. 
Based on the example on the table below, S1 is 
represent as a system developer, S2 represent 
system administrator, S3 and S4 represented as a 
system support and end user of an ePS system 
respectively. S1 has a very high skill and very good 
experience in system computer usage, system 
handling and solving error/bug. Therefore, the trust 
value of those 3 components is very trusted. 
However, S2 has low skill and poor experience 
regarding system fine tune server and network, 
thus, his trust towards the system is classify as 
untrusted. Thus, Using TPM can summarize that 
insider with good experience and high skill can be 
delegated to a trusted person. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Trust Profile Matrix in Scoring Value 
 
Experience 
Skill 
Very Low [1] Low [2] Medium [3] High [4] Very High [5] 
Very Poor [1] U U U N N 
Poor [2] U U N N T 
Neutral [3] U N N T T 
Good [4] U N T T VT 
Very Good [5] N T T VT VT 
Note: VU: Very Untrusted [1], U: Untrusted [2], N: Neutral [3], T: Trusted [4], VT: Very Trusted [5] 
 
 
Table 7: Example of Trust Value Determination 
Roles Component Skill 
Rating 
Experience 
Rating 
Trust Value 
 
 
 
S1 
Computer usage Very High Very Good Very Trusted 
System handling Very High Very Good Very Trusted 
Solving an error/bugs Very High Very Good Very Trusted 
Security policy High Very Good Very Trusted 
Fine tuning server and network Very High Very Good Very Trusted 
Total Trust Very Trusted 
 
 
S2 
Computer usage High Very Good Very Trusted 
System handling Medium Very Good Trusted 
Solving an error/bugs Medium Neutral Neutral 
Security policy High Neutral Neutral 
Fine tuning server and network Low Poor Untrusted 
Total Trust Neutral 
 
 
S3 
Computer usage High Good Trusted 
System handling Medium Good Trusted 
Solving an error/bugs Medium Poor Neutral 
Security policy High Neutral Trusted 
Fine tuning server and network Medium Very Poor Untrusted 
Total Trust Neutral 
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Roles Component Skill 
Rating 
Experience 
Rating 
Trust Value 
 
 
S4 
Computer usage Medium Neutral Neutral 
System handling Low Neutral Neutral 
Solving an error/bugs Low Very Poor Untrusted 
Security policy Low Neutral Neutral 
Fine tuning server and network Very Low Very Poor Very 
Untrusted 
Total Trust Untrusted 
 
 
4.3 Determine the Document Sensitivity Value 
Sensitivity value is classified as a weightage 
value of document that accessed by an insider. A 
rate for sensitivity value is in accordance with the 
scale from 1 to 5 which is very less sensitive to 
very sensitive. This scale weightage is adopted by 
Althebyean and Panda [10]. A sensitivity value of 
document is also given by an expert based on a 
predetermined scale. As previously described, for 
ePS case study, expert from Prodata Basis has been 
assigned the sensitivity value of each document 
function for different rows as tabulated in Table 9. 
The sensitivity of sensitivity document is based on 
type of user role in the system and the document 
accessed type either the document is sensitive or 
nor. The guideline can be referred to Table 8. A 
grant value of sensitivity document by the expert 
includes system document function. Subsequently, 
Figure 5 shows example of an insider S1 accessing 
possible document and function in payroll module. 
If developer access for path PY1, C, U, R and V, 
the sensitivity value of the document is very less 
sensitive, less sensitive, neutral, very less sensitive 
and neutral respectively. 
 
 
Table 8: Sensitivity Scoring 
ID Sensitivity 
1 Very Less Sensitive 
2 Less Sensitive 
3 Neutral 
4 Sensitive 
5 Very Sensitive 
 
Table 9: Sensitivity Value of Documents 
Role Action & Sensitivity C U R V P 
Developer LS N VLS N N 
System Administrator LS N LS S VS 
System Support N S LS VS S 
End User N S S VS VS 
Note: VLS: Very Less Sensitive [1], LS: Less Sensitive [2], N: Neutral [3], S: Sensitive [4], VS: Very Sensitive [5] 
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Figure 5: Example of Document Sensitivity for S1 
 
4.4 Determine the Navigation Document Path 
and Risk Value 
Table 10 shows an example of the 
predetermined document path navigation for insider 
role, S1 (system developer). This prediction has 
been extracted from business process of system 
requirement specification. Later on, having this 
path navigation is used as input to calculate risks 
value. 
Table 10: Document Path Navigation 
No Path 
1 PY, PY1, PY2, PY3, PY4, PY5, PY6, PY7 
2 PY, PY1, C, U, R, V 
3 PY, PY2, C, U, R, V 
4 PY, PY3, C, U, R, V 
5 PY, PY4, C, U, R, V 
6 PY, PY5, P 
7 PY, PY6, C, U, R, V 
8 PY, PY7, V 
 
4.5 Calculate Risk Value of Document Access 
Risk Matrix (RM) by Paci et al. [11] has been 
adopted in study to calculate the risk value for 
document access by an insider otherwise known as 
path navigation as shown in Table 11. The 
determination value of risk is associated with the 
threat initiated based on trust value in section 4.2 
and sensitivity value in section 4.3. Paci et al.[11] 
claimed that risk associated with a threat is given 
by the probability that a threat occurs and the 
severity of the threat. Thus, sensitivity was 
represented as quantifies the cost of the threat, 
whereas the trust value represented as quantifies the 
tendency that the threat occurs. Supposedly, higher 
the sensitivity value, higher the damage to the 
system. Same as a higher level of insider trust, 
lower the probability of insider misuse the 
authorization. 
Table 11: Scalar for Risk Value 
ID Risk Value 
2 Low 
3 Medium 
4 High 
5 Extreme 
 
RM as shown in Table 12, sensitivity value is 
depicted in the column of the table, while the trust 
value is represented in rows. The used to speculate 
the value of risk is low, moderate, high and extreme 
and represent as 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively as shown 
in Table 12. In addition, Table 13 shows an 
example result of risk value that was determines 
using RM based on sensitivity value and trust 
value. One sample of navigation path was selected. 
Each document of the path was determined the 
sensitivity value and developer role is chosen to 
assign the trust value. Then, risk value for the 
document of the path navigation is calculated by 
using RM. After that, the risk of the path navigation 
is determined based on average of the total 
document of the path. 
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Table 12: Risk Matrix of Document Access 
Trust 
Sensitivity 
Very Less 
Sensitive [1] 
Less 
Sensitive [2] Neutral [3] Sensitive [4] 
Very 
Sensitive [5] 
Untrusted [2] M M H H E 
Neutral [3] L M M H E 
Trusted [4] L M M M H 
Very Trusted [5] L L M M H 
  Note** L: Low [2], M: Moderate [3], H: High [4], E: Extreme [5] 
 
 
Table 13: Example of Risk Value Calculation 
Role Developer Path Risk Average 
Path Access PY PY1 C U R V 
 Sensitivity Value VLS (1) VLS (1) LS (2) N (3) VLS (1) N (3) 
Trust Value VT (5) VT (5) VT (5) VT (5) VT (5) VT (5) 
Risk Value L (2) L (2) L (2) M (3) L (2) M (3) Low(2) 
Note: VLS: Very Less Sensitive [1], LS: Less Sensitive [2], N: Neutral [3], S: Sensitive [4], VS: Very Sensitive [5] 
 
 
5 RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
This section describes the evaluation and 
analysis regarding insider threat risk profile. The 
analysis is divided into three sub-sections which are 
trust scoring analysis, sensitivity value analysis and 
risky path analysis.  
 
5.1 Analysis on Trust Score 
  
In business system development, certain level 
of trust is required amongst user roles such as 
bosses and staff. This is to ensure that security 
policies are irrefrangible at first place they are not 
compromised between trust and personal relations. 
Beside, lack of oversight also can raise the level of 
a negligent insider risk, such as when a third party 
uncovers the staff members that had no knowledge 
of widespread illegal or risky activities. Thus in this 
study, trust score obtained through a survey 
answered by the system users (insider) before they 
start using the system as describe in section 4.2. 
Figure 6 shows the results of the trust value based 
on different type of user role. As per stated by Li et 
al.[13] trust management is necessary in order to 
create stability and flexible access control in a 
system. 
According to a graph of a developer 
demonstrated that each of criterions in the system is 
trusted especially in fine tuning server and network. 
This is because a developer has a high expertise and 
knowledge regarding overall system including 
network and server in order to develop a system. 
Besides, a developer is categorize as a trusted 
person because of his capabilities to manage the 
system overall. Neumann [2] stated that in the 
existing commercial systems, developers and 
vendors have considerable latitude in making 
surreptitious system changes if there is any problem 
and issues of the system. Then, the developer also 
should have these trusted credentials. 
While, refers to graph of system administrator, 
and shows that his experience in security policy is 
highest. As an administrator, he should understand 
more on security policy because any organizational 
policy is influence and determine employees' 
course of action [14]. Therefore, result shows that 
system administrator has a high experience and 
skill in handling the system because, after system is 
delivering to the client side, any issue and error is 
goes to administrator. He is responsible for all 
upcoming problems. However, system support has 
a medium skill and experience in system handling 
and security policy but high skill in solving bug. 
This shows that, a system support is assigned to test 
the usability and functionality of the system 
module. Thus, his expertise is required on 
development phase and the probability the system 
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is attacked by system support is less and can be 
overcome because still in development phase. 
Next, in end user graph, from the calculation of 
the trust value, end user tend to the lowest score of 
skill and experience in which led to a trust value are 
below optimum which is an untrusted person. It is 
supported by Stanton et al. [4] where he state that 
end user as an untrusted system because, end user 
consist of different kinds of behavior different level 
of education and intention to the system in which 
might harm to the system. Graph also shows end 
user has a less skill in computer usage, solving bugs 
and security policy. This can be proving that, end 
user mostly is a public users consist of low level 
education, besides if system is problem, surely they 
do not has a skill to solved an error. 
 
 
Figure 6: Trust Score based on Role 
 
5.2 Analysis on Sensitivity Value 
According to Table 14 shows an example of 
three document path that was access by different 
insider. Based on first path, for document C, U, R 
and V is sensitive or has high level accessibility for 
system support and end user. While for developer 
and system administrator to access to the document 
is less sensitive. However, on path second shows 
the ability for developer, system administrator and 
system support to achieve the document is neutral, 
very sensitive and sensitive respectively. This is 
show that different weighted is given to different 
role. This is because, if the same sensitivity or 
weightage of document is assigned for each role, 
will help an insider easily access to those 
document. 
 
 
5.3 Analysis on Risk Value 
Risk value can be determined in different 
method or technique. For example, method that was 
proposed by Althebyan and Panda [10]where they 
do not consider trust value into their proposed 
method. Their risk value calculation is using graph 
tree and the value is depending on the document 
weightage and using a formula to get the value. 
However, in our method is also considered a graph 
tree to determine the path navigation. Then, trust 
value was added in this proposed method where the 
value of trust is retrieving from self-input survey 
that insider has been key-in. The trust value is 
retrieved from the value of skill and experience of 
the system user. Thus, the same case study has been 
applied for both methods in order to compare the 
result obtained. Table 15 shows the differences of 
risk value for both methods.  
As per illustrated in the table below, a 
developer and system support showed no 
significant differences risk value between these two 
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methods. However, the difference occurs only on 
path 6 and 8. This difference is due to the value of 
document weightage that has been assigned for 
insider being accessed is too sensitive. Besides that, 
the major difference is on system administrator and 
end user. The differences risk value shows the 
increment in this study compare to method by 
Althebyan and Panda [10]. Even though the 
difference is small and has an increment, it proved 
that trust value that was added in this study is to 
help to improve the risk value for each document 
path that is being accessed by different roles.  
The benefit of added trust value that proposed 
by this study is where it assists system owner to 
determine the risk of the confidential document or 
information if it was accessed by internal users. 
Besides, as per stated by Paci et al. [11] that insider 
threat can be identified using the advantages of 
level of trust associated with the permissions 
granted to the insider, as well as the sensitivity of 
the document to which access is granted. The risk 
value later on will be used to calculate an insider 
threat prediction in this system using a real data. 
   
 
 
Table 14: Sensitivity Value Based on Number of Accessed 
  
Table 15: Risk Value 
Roles Path 
Risk Value 
Risk Value without 
Trust [10] 
Risk Value with 
Trust (This Study) 
Developer 
PY, PY1, PY2, PY3, PY4, PY5, PY6, PY7 Low Low 
PY, PY1, C, U, R, V Low Low 
PY, PY2, C, U, R, V Low Low 
PY, PY3, C, U, R, V Low Low 
PY, PY4, C, U, R, V Low Low 
PY, PY5, P Low Moderate 
PY, PY6, C, U, R, V Low Low 
PY, PY7, V Low Moderate 
System 
Administrator 
PY, PY1, PY2, PY3, PY4, PY5, PY6, PY7 Low Low 
PY, PY1, C, U, R, V Low Moderate 
PY, PY2, C, U, R, V Low Moderate 
PY, PY3, C, U, R, V Low Moderate 
PY, PY4, C, U, R, V Low Moderate 
PY, PY5, P Low High 
PY, PY6, C, U, R, V Low Moderate 
PY, PY7, V Low High 
System 
Support 
PY, PY1, PY2, PY3, PY4, PY5, PY6, PY7 Low Low 
PY, PY1, C, U, R, V Moderate Moderate 
PY, PY2, C, U, R, V Moderate Moderate 
PY, PY3, C, U, R, V Moderate Moderate 
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Roles Path 
Risk Value 
Risk Value without 
Trust [10] 
Risk Value with 
Trust (This Study) 
PY, PY4, C, U, R, V Moderate Moderate 
PY, PY5, P Moderate High 
PY, PY6, C, U, R, V Moderate Moderate 
PY, PY7, V Moderate High 
End User 
PY, PY1, PY2, PY3, PY4, PY5, PY6, PY7 Low Moderate 
PY, PY1, C, U, R, V Moderate High 
PY, PY2, C, U, R, V Moderate High 
PY, PY3, C, U, R, V Moderate High 
PY, PY4, C, U, R, V Moderate High 
PY, PY5, P Moderate Extreme 
PY, PY6, C, U, R, V Moderate High 
PY, PY7, V Moderate Extreme 
 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
As a conclusion, we introduce an insider risk 
profile matrix in which able to quantify risk value 
of insider threat prediction framework. This new 
insider risk profile was proposed whereby as 
improvements of the framework by considering 
trust value of system user. The trust value is 
obtained by carrying out a survey based on the 
experience and skill of system users. The 
enhancement of this framework is on the (i) 
identify insider trust threat profile, (ii) calculation 
trust value and (iii) calculation of risk.  Each insider 
possesses a different trust profile. The profile that 
was selected in this study is insider skill and 
experience.  
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